This paper examines whether corporate diversification alleviates credit constraints. Lewellen (1971) shows that diversified firms have lower idiosyncratic volatility of firm cash flows and are less likely to go bankrupt than focused firms, all else held constant. High idiosyncratic risk is more of a concern to lenders during recessions, when asymmetric information problems between firms and lenders increase and the supply of bank loans decreases. We hypothesize that focused firms are more likely to become credit constrained during recessions than diversified firms. While not directly observable to outside parties, binding credit constraints cause firms to reduce investment. Therefore, controlling for differences in demand, we expect focused firms' investment rates to be more sensitive to recessions than those of their diversified rivals.
When borrower net worth (the sum of liquid assets and marketable collateral) is high, firms are likely to be well collateralized. 1 Although idiosyncratic shocks will be larger for focused firms, well collateralized firms are able to repay their loans even if a bad idiosyncratic shock occurs. In this case, asymmetric information problems between firms and lenders are small, and both focused and diversified firms have a small or zero external finance premium (the difference between the cost of external and internal funds due to asymmetric information problems). During recessions, firm cash flows and collateral values decrease due to a lower demand for company products. The drop in borrower net worth increases the probability of default. Consequently, the external finance premium rises due to lenders' higher expected monitoring and collection costs and an increase in adverse selection and moral hazard problems. As borrower net worth drops, the probability of default and the external finance premium should increase more for focused firms due to their larger idiosyncratic risk.
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The higher external finance premium faced by focused firms should lead to a higher hurdle rate and a larger drop in investment relative to diversified rivals during recessions. 1 The intuition for our empirical design comes from models showing how the business cycle affects bank lending such as Gertler (1989, 1990) . See Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) for surveys of the related literature. 2 Hadlock, Ryngaert, and Thomas (2001) show that idiosyncratic valuation errors by providers of new equity capital are diversified away for multi-segment firms. They suggest this result may translate to lenders as well. In contrast, Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) find that one reason behind corporate spin-offs may be to increase transparency to providers of equity capital.
Focused firms may also face an increase in credit rationing in recessions. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that in equilibrium banks may deny credit to firms with low credit quality rather than charge them higher interest rates due to the adverse effect higher interest rates have on the quality mix and incentives of potential borrowers. Stiglitz and Weiss also show that the group of borrowers with marginal credit quality (focused firms) is more likely to face credit rationing. The onset of recessions is often accompanied by tight monetary policy. A contraction in bank reserves leads to a reduction in the supply of bank loans, assuming banks cannot frictionlessly replace the Fed-induced shortfall in insured deposits. As discussed in Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990) , holding all else fixed, a reduction in the supply of bank loans will increase credit rationing to borrowers with marginal credit quality (focused firms) before it will affect firms with higher credit quality (diversified firms).
Empirically, if focused firms are more credit constrained in recessions they should face more stringent credit terms and more credit denials than diversified firms. Unfortunately, data on loan terms or loan denials is not generally available. Instead, similar to Gilchrist (1994), Campello (2003) , and Campello and Fluck (2003) , we use the sensitivity of growth in sales and/or growth in inventories to recessions as a measure of financial constraints. 3 Sales growth reflects the combined effect of firm pricing, advertising, output, and investment strategies, all of which are likely to be affected by a lack of funds. Inventory growth should also be sensitive to fluctuations in credit constraints, as adjustment costs are lower for inventories than for fixed assets or R&D (Hubbard, 1998) .
Therefore, we hypothesize that, holding demand fixed, diversified firms should exhibit smaller drops in sales growth and inventory growth during recessions than focused firms.
The existence of unobservables correlated with the sensitivity of growth rates to recessions may result in biased coefficients. As discussed in Kashyap and Stein (2000) , the endogeneity bias can work in either direction in this setting. For example, risk-averse managers may tend to work for diversified firms and at the same time choose to operate in less cyclical lines of business. In this case we are biased towards rejecting the null hypothesis that diversification does not alleviate credit constraints when the null hypothesis is true. Alternatively, firms operating in more cyclical lines of business may tend to be diversified to get better access to capital. In this case we may not find a difference in the sensitivity of growth to economic states between diversified and focused firms. In other words, this would bias us towards failing to reject the null hypothesis that diversification does not alleviate credit constraints when the null hypothesis is false.
We take several measures to control for unobservables. To control for the possibility that focused firms operate in more (less) cyclical industries we use narrow industry definitions and compute relativeto-industry growth rates. However, even with narrowly defined industries, it is possible that focused firms operate in more (less) cyclical niches within industries. We address this concern in several ways.
First, we control for within-industry unobservables that may be driving differences in cyclicality by including firm and business-segment fixed effects. Second, we include lagged relative-to industry sales growth to control for the possibility that focused firms operate in higher (lower) growth niches within industries and that these higher (lower) growth niches face more (less) cyclical demand. Third, we use an instrumental variables procedure and attempt to identify instruments that are correlated with focus, but are not likely to be correlated with the sensitivity of relative-to-industry sales growth to recessions.
Fourth, we use firm-level inventory tests for the manufacturing firms in our sample. A larger drop in inventory growth in recessions controlling for sales growth is particularly difficult to attribute to differences in demand cyclicality and would suggest that credit constrained firms are unable to smooth production when sales decline.
As our last endogeneity control we compare and contrast the results for bank-dependent firms (firms without bond or commercial paper ratings) and non bank-dependent firms. 4 Bank-dependent firms are more likely to face credit constraints in recessions as they lack access to commercial paper and bond markets and tend to have lower firm net worth in conjunction with higher idiosyncratic risk.
Consistent with these predictions, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) find that sales, inventory, and debt growth rates for small manufacturers (who tend to be bank-dependent) are more sensitive to recessions than those of large manufacturers. 5 Similarly, Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994) find that inventories of bank-dependent firms drop more in recessions than those of non bank-dependent firms. We expect the lower firm cash flow volatility attributable to diversification to alleviate credit constraints primarily for bank-dependent firms, since non bank-dependent firms are relatively unconstrained regardless of their organizational form. Empirically, if we find that focused firms have more cyclical behavior in both the bank-dependent and non bank-dependent sub-samples, focused firms may simply be operating in more cyclical industry niches than diversified firms. However, if we find that the cyclical behavior of focused and diversified firms differs only within the bank-dependent sub-sample, the argument that focused firms happen to operate in cyclical industry niches must explain why focused firms are not more cyclical than diversified firms within the non bank-dependent sub-sample.
We document that during recessions the average industry-adjusted growth rate in sales of bankdependent focused firms drops by 4.5% while that of segments of bank-dependent diversified firms increases by 2.9%. Thus, during recessions, bank-dependent focused firms experience a net loss of 7.4% in relative-to-industry growth in sales versus their bank-dependent diversified competitors. The difference between bank-dependent focused and diversified firms remains significant in robustness tests that control for the potential endogeneity of the diversification decision and in tests that control for survivorship bias. At the firm level, we document that growth rates in inventories of manufacturers fall more for bank-dependent focused firms than for bank-dependent diversified firms during recessions even after controlling for contemporaneous sales growth. We also document that bank-dependent focused firms experience larger drops in new debt issuances during recessions than bank-dependent diversified firms. We find no significant differences in the behavior of non bank-dependent diversified and focused firms in any of our tests. This is not surprising as firms with bond or commercial paper ratings are unlikely to be credit constrained regardless of their organizational structure.
Our results show that bank-dependent focused firms experience a larger drop in sales and inventory growth rates during recessions than bank-dependent diversified firms. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that corporate diversification alleviates credit constraints. However, diversification has potential costs as well. For example, Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000) point out that diversification may create costly agency problems between division managers and the CEO. While firms may improve their access to external credit by diversifying, the timing of recessions is uncertain and diversification has costs as well as benefits, making it unlikely that all vulnerable firms would diversify in anticipation of binding credit constraints.
Our paper contributes to the diversification literature in at least two ways. First, we examine whether focused firms face tighter external credit constraints than diversified firms. In contrast, studies on the efficiency of internal capital markets such as Lamont (1997) , Shin and Stulz (1998) , Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) , Khanna and Tice (2001) , and Billet and Mauer (2003) examine how diversified firms allocate scarce capital between divisions. Second, we examine differences in real activity between diversified and focused firms. In contrast, others compute imputed firm values to assess whether diversified firms sell at a discount or premium (Berger and Ofek (1995) , Campa and Kedia (2002) and Mansi and Reeb (2002) ).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data and presents summary statistics. Section 2 contains segment-level investment tests while Section 3 contains firm-level investment tests. Firm-level debt tests are discussed in Section 4. Concluding remarks are in Section 5.
The Sample and Data

Sample Construction and Variable Definition
Segment data is obtained from the 1996 Compustat annual business segment file covering the period from 1978 -1996. For fiscal years ending after December 15, 1977, FASB No. 14 and SEC Regulation S-K require firms to report items for business segments that are "significant" to the firm as a whole. A business segment is regarded as "significant" if revenues, assets or profits exceed 10 percent of consolidated firm totals. Firms are also required to consider inter-period comparability. For instance, a business segment that has been significant in the past, and is expected to be significant in the future, is a reportable segment even if it fails to satisfy the 10 percent rule in the current year. We classify a company as focused if it has only one reportable business segment for the prior fiscal year. If the company has more than one reportable business segment we classify it as diversified. 6 In a diversified firm, some of the idiosyncratic volatility of segment cash flows will be diversified away if segment cash flows are not perfectly correlated. The diversification effect should be greater for firms operating in unrelated businesses. As has been discussed by Lamont (1997) and others it is difficult to accurately rank diversified firms based on the degree of diversity in their operations from scrutinizing SIC codes. It turns out that this may not be much of a concern. As is pointed out by Lewellen (1971) and Levy and Sarnat (1970) , lending decisions are based on the probability of bankruptcy, which is an extreme event. Lewellen (1971) argues that even a modest degree of conglomeration generates the bulk of bankruptcy risk reduction. He further states, "Since it is just extremes which are critical to the lending decision, the usual framework for treating diversification (examining the weighted average dispersion of income stream combinations) happens not to be very well set up to address questions of debt capacity." Hence, whether a firm is diversified in some modest manner is what is most relevant.
Since a reportable segment must be a "significant" portion of the firm's operations, this suggests a nontrivial level of diversification for firms with multiple reportable segments. If anything, our classification scheme biases us against finding results, as multi-segment firms in our sample may be diversified into diverse or related areas. In support of our measure of diversification, we later show that the diversified firms in our sample have significantly lower variability in operating cash flows than the single segment firms.
We recognize that Compustat segment data is noisy. As has been pointed out by Lamont (1997) , firms allocate (perhaps arbitrarily) overhead costs and assets between segments, making comparisons between segments of different firms problematic. Although guidelines exist to help firms identify reportable segments, Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) document that some introductions and removals of segments cannot be linked to diversification or re-focusing announcements. This supports the premise that arbitrary factors may influence segment reporting. We address these segment data problems by replicating our segment level tests at the firm level.
During the 1978-1996 period of our study there are three official NBER recessions: (1) January 1980 − July 1980; (2) July 1981 -November 1982; and (3) July 1990 − March 1991. Quarterly changes in real GDP over the sample period are plotted in Figure 1 , quarterly changes in inventories are plotted in Figure 2 , and the monthly Federal Funds Rate, an indicator of monetary policy, is plotted in Figure 3 . Recessions are indicated with the tall shaded bars on the graphs. Blinder and Maccini (1991) document that in postwar U.S. recessions, declines in inventory investment accounts for 87% of the drop in GNP on average. A positive relationship between GDP and inventories is evident in Figures 1 and 2. The first two recessions appear to be more severe, as they have a larger drop in GDP and a correspondingly larger drop in inventories. They also began during periods of tight monetary policy as can be seen in Figure 3 .
Two of the three recessions in our sample period overlap two calendar years. Since segment level data is available only annually, we are unable to precisely match company data to each NBER recession period. Instead, we use two-year non-overlapping observation intervals in our tests. We classify the periods of 1979 -1980, 1981 -1982, and 1990 -1991 as recession periods and the periods of 1983 -1984, 1986 -1987, 1988 -1989, 1992 -1993, and 1994 -1995 as non-recession periods. 7 Our classification ensures that the beginning of each two-year recession period (our reference point for growth in sales and growth in inventories) does not fall within an NBER recession period regardless of a firm's fiscal year end. In addition, by using two-year periods we treat a recession that overlaps two calendar years as a single event instead of two independent yearly events. The drawback to our approach is that, dependent on firms' fiscal year-end, some recession observations either fail to include the final months of a recession or include some non-recession months. This may hinder our efforts to find differences between recession and non-recession periods.
For a segment to be included in the initial sample, it and its parent firm must have non-missing sales both at the beginning and the end of a two-year observation period. The restriction is necessary to calculate segment and firm growth rates, and results in an initial sample of 40,455 segment-period observations. We do not include segments of firms with at least one segment in SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 (Financial Service Industry) or between 4900 and 4941 (Regulated Utilities). Like Berger and Ofek (1995) and Shin and Stulz (1998) , we eliminate the segments of firms where the sum of segment sales differs from total firm sales by more than one percent (3,616 segment-period observations). We also eliminate segments with beginning sales of less than or equal to $20 million (2001 dollars) since the growth rates of such small segments are often extreme (9,325 segment-period observations).
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To calculate our control variables, we require that segments have data on operating income, assets and capital expenditures, and that parent firms have data on assets, operating income before depreciation, and capital expenditures for the fiscal year preceding the two-year observation period. 7 There are an odd number of years between 1982 and 1990, so one year needs to be omitted. We avoid omitting a year during the two-year periods preceding or following recessions, as cyclical movements may be most evident at these times. The results we report omit 1985. Similar results are generated if we omit 1987 instead. 8 We examine a lower cutoff of $10 million for segment sales. The lower cutoff increases the final sample by 3,105 segment-period observations but does not alter our results.
We exclude firms if their cash holdings or their total debt for the prior fiscal year are less than 0% or more than 100% of total assets. These additional restrictions further reduce the sample by 1,368 segment-period observations.
Finally, to capture trade-offs between focused firms and their diversified rivals, we only include segments from industries with at least one focused firm and at least one segment of a diversified firm over the observation period. 9 To make industry adjustments meaningful, we exclude industries that do not have at least three segments in existence over the observation period. These final two restrictions further reduce the sample by 5,604 segment-period observations, leaving us with a final sample of 20,542 segment-period observations. Individual segments are allowed to drop out and re-enter the sample based on whether the required data is available for a given two-year observation period.
To differentiate credit constraint explanations from alternative ones, we separate firms into two sub-samples based on whether they are bank-dependent. Bank-dependent firms are firms that have neither a bond rating nor a commercial paper rating. If a firm has either a bond rating or a commercial paper rating it is classified as non bank-dependent. Due to data availability, we use S&P bond ratings To address the concern that focused firms may exhibit more cyclical behavior because they operate in more cyclical industries, we define industries by segment four-digit primary SIC codes, as this is the most specific industry definition available in our dataset. 10 Industry-adjustments are done by taking the deviation from the industry median. Median industry values are calculated using segments of both focused firms and diversified firms that operate in a four-digit SIC code. Firm level data does not allow for industry adjustments as diversified firms operate in multiple industries. Table 1 contains detailed definitions of the variables used in our tests.
Sample Summary Statistics
Panel A of Table 2 reports summary statistics dividing the full sample of business segment observations into focused firms and diversified firm segments, and into recession and non-recession periods. Sales and assets are reported in 2001 dollars and growth rates in sales and inventory are adjusted for inflation.
There are 10,741 segment-period observations for focused firms and 9,801 segment-period observations for diversified firms. Focused firms in our sample are larger than the corresponding segments of 10 Clarke (1989) shows that firms with the same four-digit SIC codes do not behave similarly with respect to sales, profit and stock price changes. However, he states that his study is biased against finding similarities within firm four-digit SIC codes as he aggregates financial results over the multiple SIC code divisions of diversified firms. We use segment four-digit SIC codes not firm four-digit SIC codes for our tests. diversified firms. In addition, focused firms have higher average cash-to-assets ratios than diversified firms and are less likely to have a bond rating.
The average industry-adjusted growth rate in sales for focused firms is 5.4% lower during recessions than during non-recession periods. Therefore, average relative-to-industry growth in sales is cyclical for focused firms, dropping in recessions and rising during non-recessions. In contrast, the average industry-adjusted growth rate in sales of segments of diversified firms is 1.3% higher during recessions than during non-recession periods.
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A central prediction of Lewellen (1971) is that diversified firms have lower variability in operating cash flows, which lowers their bankruptcy risk. Since our hypothesis is built on this belief, we test whether it holds in our sample. Panel B of Table 2 reports the results from a firm-level regression of the standard deviation of quarterly operating cash flows (Compustat quarterly item 21) over each twoyear period on firm size, focus, and two-digit SIC code fixed effects. All independent variables are measured at the beginning of each two-year period. Measuring the standard deviation of firm operating cash flows within each two-year period allows us to capture cash flow variability unrelated to the business cycle. This is important since we hypothesize that credit constraints will further increase the variability of focused firms' sales growth across the business cycle. Consistent with the predictions of Lewellen (1971) , focused firms have significantly larger variability in operating cash flows than diversified firms.
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In our sample, the average number of diversified firm segments is higher during recessions than during normal times while the opposite is true for focused firms. We further explore this finding in Table 2 where we show the fraction of segments from diversified firms for each two-year observation period. Similar to Comment and Jarrell (1995), we find that the fraction of segments from diversified firms decreases steadily over the sample period. Two of the three recessions in our study 11 The mean industry-adjusted growth rates for both focused and diversified firms are positive values due to positive skewness in industry-adjusted growth in sales around the median. 12 We later separate our sample into bank-dependent and non bank-dependent sub-samples. Focused firms have larger variability in operating cash flows within each sub-sample.
took place in the early 1980's, when there are relatively more diversified firms. Thus, the corporate refocusing trend over the sample period along with the timing of recessions explains the lower number of focused firms during recessions than during non-recession periods and the higher number of diversified firms during recessions than during non-recession periods. We control for this regularity in the data by including a time trend variable in the regressions that follow.
Business Segment Level Tests
Baseline Model
Our hypothesis is that corporate diversification alleviates credit constraints. If so, the relative-toindustry sales growth rates of focused firms should drop more than those of diversified firms in recessions. 13 To distinguish credit constraint explanations from alternative ones, we add an additional layer of contrast and identify firms as bank-dependent or non bank-dependent. If the diversified corporate form alleviates credit constraints, it should be apparent within the sample of bank-dependent firms. We hypothesize that investment growth rate sensitivities of diversified and focused firms should not differ within the non bank-dependent sub-sample, as these firms are unlikely to be credit constrained in recessions. The baseline model we estimate is given by the expression:
Ind. Adj. Segment Sales Growth i, t to t+2 = α + β 1 Focus Dummy i,t + β 2 Recession Dummy t to t+2 (1) + β 3 [Recession Dummy t to t+2 X Focus Dummy i,t ] + β 4 Firm Cash/Assets i, t + β 5 Firm Debt/Assets i, t + β 6 Ind.Adj. Segment OPM i, t-1 to t + β 7 Ind. Adj. Segment CAPX/Assets i, t-1 to t + β 8 log Firm Sales i, t-1 to t + ε i, t where i represents the segment and t represents the beginning of the two-year observation period. The dependent variable is industry-adjusted growth rate in segment sales over the two-year observation period. Our primary interest is whether the interaction of the recession dummy with the focus dummy is statistically and economically significant, as it represents the difference between the marginal effect of recessions on focused firms and the marginal effect of recessions on diversified firms. If corporate diversification alleviates credit constraints, the coefficient on the interaction term should be negative and significant within the bank-dependent sub-sample.
We include industry-adjusted segment capital expenditures/assets and the log of firm sales as control variables. 14 Segments with larger capital expenditures are expected to subsequently experience larger growth in sales while larger firms are expected to grow slower. We also include three variables to capture borrowing capacity and internal funds. They are firm cash/assets, firm debt/assets, and industry-adjusted segment operating profit margin (OPM). All control variables are measured for the year preceding the two-year observation period. Firm cash/assets is measured as cash and marketable securities divided by total firm assets, firm debt/assets is measured as the sum of short term debt plus long-term debt divided by total firm assets, and segment operating profit margin is measured as segment operating income before depreciation divided by segment sales. The Compustat data items are presented in Table 1 .
Due to the decrease in the fraction of segments from diversified firms over time, we include a time trend variable to all regressions shown in Table 3 but do not report its estimated coefficient. This variable is defined as the distance, in years, of the observation period from 1979. The results are similar whether or not this variable is included. Since the sample contains observations for multiple segments from diversified firms in a given two-year observation period, we adjust standard errors for within firm-period error correlation in addition to heteroskedasticity.
Estimates of Baseline Model
The estimated coefficients for Eq.
(1) are displayed as Model 1 in Panel A of Table 3 . For the bankdependent sub-sample, the coefficient on the interaction of the recession dummy with the focus dummy 14 To avoid requiring an additional year of data we measure capital spending by dividing capital expenditures during year t-1 by assets at the end of year t-1 rather than the beginning of year t-1.
is negative and significant at the one percent level. This result indicates that the relative-to-industry sales growth of focused firms is more sensitive to recessions. The marginal effects imply that recessions lead to a drop in industry-adjusted growth in sales of 4.5% for focused firms and a rise in industry-adjusted growth in sales of 2.9% for segments of diversified firms. Thus, focused firms experience a net loss of 7.4% in industry-adjusted sales growth versus segments of diversified firms during recessions. To the extent that we have controlled for difference in demand by using narrow industry definitions and industry-adjusted growth rates, this result is consistent with bank-dependent focused firms facing binding credit constraints during recessions.
We next examine the sub-sample of non bank-dependent firms. We hypothesize that focused and diversified firms within the non bank-dependent sub-sample should exhibit similar sensitivity of growth to recessions, as these firms are unlikely to be credit constrained. The estimates of Eq. (1) for the non bank-dependent sub-sample are presented in the second column of Model 1 in Panel A of Table 3 . The interaction of the focus dummy with the recession dummy is not significant within the non bankdependent sub-sample of firms. Assuming independence, the difference in the coefficients across the two sub-samples (Bank Dependent -Non-Bank Dependent) is − 7.1% with a t-statistic of 2.85.
Therefore credit constraints seem a likely explanation for the greater cyclicality of focused firms in the bank-dependent sub-sample.
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In Model 2 of Table 3 we allow the coefficients on the three variables that capture borrowing capacity and internal funds to vary from recessions to non recession periods. It is likely that firms use their internal funds and borrowing capacity differently over the two regimes. However, after controlling for these additional effects, the coefficients and significance levels on the key variables remain similar to the results reported for Model 1.
We use the most specific definition of industries available in our data set to control for the possibility that focused firms operate in more cyclical industries and that this, rather than the focused firm form, is behind their greater investment sensitivity to recessions. However, even with narrowly defined industries, it is possible that focused firms operate in more cyclical niches within industries. To control for this possibility, we include segment fixed effects (Model 3 in Panel B of Table 3 ), and firm fixed effects (Model 4 in Panel B of Table 3 ). Since the coefficients and significance levels are similar for Model 3 and Model 4, we use the estimates for Model 3 to discuss the marginal effects. For the bank-dependent sub-sample, the interaction of the recession dummy with the focus dummy is once again negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. During non-recessions, focused firms have an industry-adjusted growth in sales that is 6.5% lower than that for segments of diversified firms.
During recessions that difference widens as focused firms have an industry-adjusted growth rate in sales 11.6% lower than that of their diversified rivals. Thus, focused firms experience a net loss of 5.1% in industry-adjusted sales growth during recessions compared to segments of diversified firms.
We next include lagged one-year industry-adjusted growth in segment sales in Eq.
(1) to control for the possibility that focused firms are in higher or lower growth niches within industries and that these higher or lower growth niches face more cyclical demand. This requires an additional year of data which forces us to drop 26% of the observations in the sample, including all observations from the recession period of 1979 -1980. The ceteris paribus interpretation of the coefficients is that a recession leads to a rise in industry-adjusted growth in sales of 1.9% for segments of bank-dependent diversified firms and a drop in industry-adjusted growth in sales of 2.5% for bank-dependent focused firms. 16 In other words, there is a net loss of 4.4% in industry-adjusted sales growth for focused firms versus segments of diversified firms during recessions. We also repeat the test by using lagged two-year industry-adjusted growth in segment sales. While we lose 33% of all observations in the sample, we still find a net loss of 3.6% in industry-adjusted sales growth for bank-dependent focused firms versus segments of bank-dependent diversified firms during recessions. These results are not shown.
Another way to control for non-credit constraint explanations for differences between focused and diversified firms is to compare the results for the bank-dependent and non bank-dependent sub-samples.
In all models shown in Table 3 , the coefficient on the interaction of the focus dummy with the recession dummy is negative and significant at the 1% level for the bank-dependent sub-sample but not significant for the non bank-dependent sub-sample. Furthermore, the difference in the interaction coefficients across the two sub-samples (Bank Dependent -Non-Bank Dependent) is statistically significant at the 5% level or better. These results are consistent with binding credit constraints for bank-dependent focused firms.
Though we include the log of deflated firm sales in the regression to control for firm size, we perform an additional test to verify that differences in firm size are not driving the results. For the bank-dependent sub-sample there are 15,509 segment-period observations, 9,245 for focused firms and 6,264 for diversified firms. On average, the focused firms in this sub-sample are smaller than the diversified firms. We rank observations by firm size and divide the bank-dependent sub-sample into three size groups. Though not shown, the coefficient of the interaction of the focus dummy with the recession dummy in Eq. (1) is negative and significant at the 1% level for the small and medium size group and negative and significant at the 5% level for the large size group. Thus, it appears that focus, rather than firm size, is driving the observed cyclical sales growth.
Our findings in this section are related to those of Titman (1994), Campello (2003) , and Campello and Fluck (2003) . Campello, and Campello and Fluck find that high debt relative-to-industry has a negative impact on relative-to-industry sales growth during recessions while Opler and Titman find that high debt has a negative impact on relative-to-industry sales growth during "distressed" industry periods. We find that another firm variable related to financing, firm focus, has a negative impact on relative-to-industry sales growth during recessions.
Endogeneity in Levels Versus Sensitivities
We face similar endogeneity issues as in Kashyap and Stein (2000) as the focus dummy may be correlated with unobservables affecting either the level of relative-to-industry growth in sales and/or the sensitivity of relative-to-industry growth in sales to recessions. Like Kashyap and Stein (among others), we consider an endogeneity bias in the sensitivity of growth to recessions to be more important for testing our hypothesis and use a micro-macro sensitivity approach (a cross-section of firms across time) in our tests. With certain assumptions, the micro-macro sensitivity approach allows us to test the sensitivity of relative-to-industry growth in sales to recessions even if endogeneity in the level of firm growth is present. We apply Kashyap and Stein's intuition to our setting with the following example.
Suppose that focused firms operate in higher growth niches of their industries. To the extent that segment fixed effects, prior period capital expenditures, prior period profitability or lagged relative-toindustry sales growth are imperfect controls, there may still be a positive association between the focus dummy and relative-to-industry growth in sales that results in a positive bias in the coefficient on the focus dummy. However, as stated in Kashyap and Stein, this type of endogeneity does not necessarily result in a biased coefficient on the interaction of the focus dummy with the recession dummy, our coefficient of interest. For example, our inferences are valid if the only variation in the focus dummy is due to focused firms operating in high growth niches.
If we have properly controlled for unobservables that are correlated with the focus dummy and that affect the level of relative-to-industry growth in sales, our hypothesis suggests that relative-to-industry sales growth of bank-dependent focused firms should be lower than that of segments of diversified firms during recessions. In Table 3 the coefficient on the focus dummy changes sign as various endogeneity controls are applied. This suggests that our basic specification has endogeneity regarding the level of the coefficient on the focus dummy. Consequently, we do not always find that focused firms have lower levels of relative-to-industry growth in recessions. However, consistent with our hypothesis, the coefficient on the interaction of the focus dummy with the recession dummy is always negative and significant at the 1% level. In other words, irrespective of the level growth in non-recessions, the relative-to-industry growth rates of focused firms drop more in recessions. Therefore, endogeneity in the levels does not seem to translate to endogeneity in the coefficient on the interaction term.
Instrumental Variables Estimation
The most salient endogeneity concern is that of an endogenous link between being focused and the sensitivity of sales growth to recessions. We next address this concern using an instrumental variables procedure similar to one used in Campa and Kedia (2002) . We suppress the time subscripts for simplicity and rewrite Eq. (1) 
where X i is a vector for segment i containing the following k variables: a constant, a recession dummy, firm cash/assets, firm debt/assets, industry-adjusted segment capital expenditures/assets, industryadjusted segment operating profit margin , log of firm sales, and a time trend variable. 17 The focus dummy, "Focus i " is a potentially endogenous binary explanatory variable and equals 1 if the segment is from a focused firm and 0 if the segment is from a diversified firm. If Focus i is endogenous, its interaction with the recession dummy "Recession" is also endogenous.
Since the dependent variable is industry-adjusted, it is independent of characteristics that affect all segments in an industry in the same period in the same way. Therefore, we need instruments that vary across segments in the same industry. We attempt to identify instruments that are correlated with whether a segment is from a focused firm or a diversified firm, but are not likely to be correlated the sensitivity of relative-to-industry sales growth to recessions. We measure all instruments for the year preceding the two-year observation period.
The first instrument for diversification is MI, a minority interest dummy which equals 1 if the segment belongs to a firm with a non-zero amount of minority interest. The presence of minority interest indicates that minority shareholders own equity in a subsidiary of the company. At some point, the firm acquired a majority of the voting stock of another company. Since some mergers are diversifying acquisitions into new industries, minority interest should be negatively correlated with the focus dummy. If unobservables vary over time, MI may not be correlated with contemporaneous segment-level unobservables. For example, a firm may have diversified several years ago when it had risk-averse managers or when it operated in a cyclical industry niche. However, current management may be less risk averse, or the firm's product mix may have changed towards less cyclical products.
Minority interest is less likely to be correlated with segment-level unobservables than one lag of the focus dummy, as minority interest may have been created several years ago.
We borrow our second and third instruments from Campa and Kedia (2002) . The second instrument is PSDIV, the fraction of industry sales (excluding segment i) belonging to segments of diversified firms. This instrument captures the overall attractiveness of the industry (excluding the segment in question) to conglomerates. However, since the measure excludes segment i, this instrument is not likely to be correlated with unobservables that impact the segment's relative-toindustry sales growth sensitivity to recessions.
The third instrument is SNP, a dummy which equals 1 if the segment belongs to a firm whose stock is a member of the S&P 500. According to Standard & Poor's, the S&P 500 does not represent the largest, or even the best 500 stocks that are traded in the United States. Rather, the stocks of domestic corporations are selected to best reflect the U.S. stock market. Therefore, membership in the S&P 500
is not likely to be correlated with unobservables that impact the sensitivity of relative-to-industry-sales growth to recessions. However, there is a concern that firms in the S&P 500 have better visibility, which may result in better access to capital. To address this concern we show our results with and without this instrument. Focus i,t * Recession Dummy t to t+2 = α 0 + α 1 Firm Cash/Assets i,t + α 2 Firm Debt/Assets i, t (4) + α 3 Ind. Adj. Segment OPM i, t-1 to t + α 4 Ind. Adj. Segment CAPX/Assets i, t-1 to t + α 5 log Firm Sales i, t-1 to t + α 6 Recession Dummy t to t+2 + α 7 Time Trend t + δ 1 Ĝ i,t + δ 2 Ĝ i,t * Recession Dummy t to t+2 + ν 2 i,t
We estimate the F-statistic for an exclusion restriction that δ 1 = δ 2 = 0 for each equation. The null hypothesis that they are jointly zero is rejected at the 1% level for both reduced form equations, in both the bank-dependent and the non bank-dependent sub-samples. Therefore, our estimated instruments are correlated with the endogenous variables, a necessary requirement for instrumental variables.
The instrumental variables estimates and standard errors for Eq (2) are shown in the last two columns in Panel A of Table 4 for the bank-dependent and non bank-dependent sub-samples. The coefficient on the interaction of the focus dummy with the recession dummy remains negative and statistically significant at the 1% level for the sub-sample of bank-dependent firms. The marginal effects show that recessions lead to a drop in industry-adjusted growth in sales of 6.4% for focused firms and a rise in industry-adjusted growth in sales of 5.2% for segments of diversified firms. Thus, focused firms experience a net loss of 11.6% in industry-adjusted sales growth versus segments of diversified firms during recessions. Interestingly, it seems that the instrumental variables approach corrects for biases in the level of growth. The relative-to-industry sales growth of focused firms is similar (1.2% higher) to that of diversified firms in non-recessions, but focused firms have a relative-toindustry sales growth rate 10.4% lower than that of segments of diversified firms in recessions. The coefficient on the interaction of the focus dummy with the recession dummy remains insignificant for the sub-sample of firms that are non bank-dependent. The results are similar if we repeat our tests excluding SNP as an instrument (see Panel B of Table 4 ). The results are also similar if we use any one of the three instruments alone to create the generated instruments. Therefore, our findings are robust to using an instrumental variables procedure to control for unobservables.
Survivorship Bias and Self-Selection
Our tests contain a potential survivorship bias, as the research design requires segments to remain in the sample during the respective two-year observation period. In this section, we employ the Heckman (1979) self-selection model to test and correct for survivorship bias. We estimate a probit model that predicts the probability a segment remains in our sample during a particular two-year period using all segments that exist at the beginning of the two-year period. The Inverse Mills Ratio from the first stage probit is used as an explanatory variable in a second stage OLS estimation of industry-adjusted growth in sales for surviving segments. This additional term controls for the potential self-selection bias due to the survivorship requirements of our sample.
Along with the explanatory variables in Eq. (1), the probit that predicts segment survival from time t to t+2 includes the growth in total industry sales from t to t+2. Growth in industry sales is likely to be correlated with segment exit, but unlikely to affect the industry-adjusted growth rate of any particular segment within the industry. The segment industry-adjusted operating profit margin and capital expenditures are calculated using both exiting and surviving segments. The first two columns of Table   5 show the results from the probit estimation for bank-dependent and non bank-dependent firms. As hypothesized, industry growth in sales is significantly and positively related to segment survival for both the bank-dependent and non-bank dependent sub-samples. This indicates that we have met the exclusion restriction necessary to distinguish sample selection from mis-specified functional form.
The results from the second-stage OLS regression of industry-adjusted growth in sales are reported in the last two columns of Table 5 . The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and corrected in the second stage for including a prediction from the first stage. The coefficient on the interaction of the recession dummy with the focus dummy remains negative and significant at the 1% level for the sub-sample of firms that are bank-dependent, and insignificant for the sub-sample of non bank-dependent firms. We conclude that the survivorship bias within our sample cannot explain the differences between the relative-to-industry sales growth of focused firms and segments of their diversified rivals. In the remaining sections of the paper, we further examine the robustness of our results using firm level data.
Firm-Level Sales and Inventory Growth
In this section we analyze firm-level growth in sales and growth in inventories for firms meeting the segment level data requirements. We examine firm-level data for three reasons. First, it is possible that diversified firms exhibit different behavior than focused firms across the business cycle due to the shifting of funds between segments of diversified firms rather than better access to external funds. If our results are driven by diversified firms' having better access to external credit, we expect to find similar results at the segment-and firm-level. Second, Compustat segment data has been criticized as being noisy since firms allocate (perhaps arbitrarily) overhead costs and assets between segments.
Companies may follow different procedures when allocating company-wide accounts to individual segments, making comparisons between segments of different firms problematic. Using firm-level sales growth addresses this concern. Third, the main endogeneity concern is that of an endogenous link between focus and the sensitivity of sales growth to recessions. Inventory tests are useful in linking differences between focused and diversified firm behavior to financial constraints. A larger drop in inventory growth in recessions controlling for sales growth is particularly difficult to attribute to differences in product demand, but would be consistent with credit constrained firms being unable to smooth production when sales decline. Inventory data is only available at the firm level.
Firm Level Sales Growth
We examine the sensitivity of firm sales growth to recessions by estimating a variation of Eq. (1) where i represents the firm, j represents the 2-digit firm SIC code, and t represents the beginning of the two-year observation period. Firm-level data does not allow for industry adjustments, as diversified firms operate in more than one industry. Nevertheless, we attempt to control for industry effects by estimating the equation as a panel data with firm two-digit SIC code industry fixed effects. We include a time trend variable in all regressions shown in Table 6 but do not report its estimated coefficient. This variable is defined as the distance, in years, of the observation period from 1979.
The estimates of Eq. (5) are displayed as Model 1 in Table 6 . The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and within industry-period correlation using the Huber-White robust estimator.
Consistent with the results at the segment level, the coefficient on the interaction of the recession dummy with the focus dummy is negative and significant at less than 1% for the sub-sample of bankdependent firms. The marginal effects imply that a recession leads to a drop in the growth rate of firm sales of 9.6% for diversified firms and 18.7% for focused firms. Thus, bank-dependent focused firms experience a net loss of 9.1% in their firm sales growth rate versus bank-dependent diversified firms during recessions. The interaction term is not significant for the sub-sample of non bank-dependent firms, suggesting that the results for bank-dependent firms are not driven by unobservables correlated with diversification.
Two other variations of Eq. (5) are shown in Table 6 . Model 2 allows the three variables that capture borrowing capacity and internal funds to vary over the business cycle. Model 3 includes firm fixed effects. The coefficient on the interaction of the recession dummy with the focus dummy is significant in both models for the bank-dependent sub-sample but not for the non bank-dependent subsample. Assuming independence, a test of the difference in the coefficient across the two sub-samples (Bank Dependent -Non-Bank Dependent) has a t-statistic of at least 2.0 in both models.
As discussed in Section 1, our sample only includes segments (and their respective parent firms) in four-digit SIC industries with at least one focused firm and at least one segment of a diversified firm over a given observation period. The restriction is used to capture differences between focused firms and their diversified rivals; however, it amounts to filtering the data using a potentially endogenous variable. In Model 4 of Table 6 we test whether our inferences are robust to dropping this data restriction. The coefficient on the interaction of the recession dummy with the focus dummy remains negative and significant at the 1% level for the bank-dependent sample, and remains insignificant for the non-bank-dependent sample.
In summary, we obtain similar results using both firm-level and segment-level data. Since the results hold at the firm level, it seems unlikely that the difference in the behavior of focused and diversified firms is due exclusively to the shifting of funds between divisions of diversified firms. In addition, the firm-level tests increase our confidence that the results in Section 2 are not driven by problems with the Compustat segment data.
Firm Level Inventory Growth
Blinder and Maccini (1991) show that the drop in inventory investment accounts for 87 percent of the drop in GNP during an average postwar recession. Hubbard (1998) suggests that investment in inventory should respond more to fluctuations in credit constraints than investment in fixed assets or R&D, as inventory adjustment costs are lower. Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show that during recessions, credit constrained manufacturers appear to be unable to finance inventories to smooth production. An examination of inventory growth across the business cycle provides an additional advantage over an examination of sales growth. A finding that inventory growth rates of focused firms fall more than those of diversified firms after controlling for the influence of sales seems particularly hard to attribute to demand-based explanations such as focused firms operating in more cyclical industry niches or risk-averse managers choosing less cyclical projects along with diversification. However, such a finding would suggest that focused firms are unable to smooth production when sales are declining, a result consistent with focused firms facing credit constraints in recessions.
To examine inventories we estimate Equation (5) using firm growth in inventories as the dependent variable rather than firm growth in sales. We use only manufacturing firms in our inventory tests because they contain the majority of inventories. In addition, the macroeconomic literature on inventories is based on the production-smoothing model which applies naturally to manufacturers. We define manufacturing firms as those with firm SIC codes beginning with a two or three. We require that firms have non-zero inventory levels at the beginning of a given two-year period to be in our sample.
The estimated coefficients for the base model are shown as Model 1 in Table 7 . The marginal effects imply that recessions lead to a drop in the growth rate of firm inventory of 14.4% for bankdependent diversified firms and a drop of 26.4% for bank-dependent focused firms. Thus, the growth rate in inventories drops 12.2% more for bank-dependent focused firms than for diversified firms during recessions. Consistent with a credit constraint explanation, the interaction term is not significant for the sub-sample of non bank-dependent firms.
Three other model variations are shown in Table 7 . Model 2 allows the three variables that capture borrowing capacity and internal funds to vary over the business cycle. Model 3 includes contemporaneous firm growth in sales, and Model 4 replaces industry fixed effects with firm fixed effects. In all three alternative models, inventory growth rates drop significantly more for bankdependent focused firms than for bank-dependent diversified firms during recessions. Model 3 is of particular interest as it controls for the influence of sales growth on inventory growth. In other words, we document a larger drop in the inventory growth rates of focused firms within the bank-dependent sub-sample (significant at the 5.0% level) even after controlling for contemporaneous sales growth.
This finding is particularly hard to attribute to non-financial explanations such as differences in demand, but is consistent with corporate diversification alleviating credit constraints.
Debt Financing Across the Business Cycle
Korajczyk and Levy (2003) examine debt financing patterns of financially constrained and unconstrained firms across the business cycle and document pro-cyclical debt ratios for financially constrained firms. As a final test we examine differences in the sensitivity of debt financing to recessions between focused and diversified firms. Studying debt financing patterns in isolation is not well suited for differentiating credit constraint effects from alternative ones for at least two reasons.
First, we lack data on loan terms or loan denials. Second, the absence of new financing during recessions is consistent with both deteriorating credit supply and lower credit demand. Controlling for differences in credit demand is considerably more challenging than controlling for differences in product demand because financing data is not observable at the segment level. Despite these limitations, we hypothesize that credit constraints during recessions work in part through the inability of firms to issue new debt. Consequently, we test whether bank-dependent focused firms experience larger drops in new debt issuances during recessions than bank-dependent diversified firms. Similar to our growth in sales tests, we measure relative credit constraints by comparing differences in the sensitivity of net debt issuances to recessions for focused and diversified firms.
We measure net debt issuances from the statement of cash flow data on Compustat. We define net debt issuances as long-term debt issuances (Data 111) minus long-term debt reductions (Data 114) plus changes in current debt (Data 301). We assume that changes in current debt are zero when Data 301 is missing. Our results are not affected if we define net debt issuances as long-term debt issuances (Data
111) minus long-term debt reductions (Data 114). For comparison purposes, we standardize net debt
issuances by beginning-of-period firm assets.
While our hypothesis clearly predicts relatively less net debt issuances during recessions for more constrained firms, the effect of credit constraints on debt reductions is ambiguous. For example, a large debt reduction may either indicate inability to replace maturing debt or a managerial decision to repay existing debt. Under the first scenario, a firm with a net debt reduction on Compustat is relatively more constrained than a firm with a reported zero or a positive net debt issuance amount. However, under the debt repayment scenario, a firm with a net debt reduction is less constrained than a firm with zero net debt issues. To avoid this ambiguity, we code firms with net debt reductions as firms with no new debt issues. We then estimate the following equation at the firm level: Equation (6) is a left-censored tobit model that assumes credit constraints are linearly related to the amount of net debt issued as a fraction of beginning-of-period-assets. Similar to Korajczyk and Levy (2003) , Fama and French (2002) , and Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) we include a number of control variables to capture differences in internal funds, existing capital needs for investment and operations, and existing capital structure. We expect net debt issued to be negatively related to the amount of cash relative to assets (Cash/Assets), and positively related to firm capital expenditures over assets (Firm CAPX/Assets). We include firm size (log firm sales) as an additional proxy for growth opportunities and expect larger firms to have lower growth opportunities and thus lower need for external financing.
The coefficient estimates of Eq. (6) along with the marginal effects are shown as Model 1 in Table   8 . In Model 2 of Table 8 we allow the coefficients on the three variables that capture borrowing capacity and internal funds to vary from recessions to non recession periods. The coefficient estimates along with the marginal effects of the expanded model are shown as Model 2 in Table 8 . We find that bank-dependent focused firms have a higher probability of net debt issues in normal times and a lower probability of net debt issues during recessions relative to bank-dependent diversified firms. Since inferences are similar for both models, we only discuss the estimated marginal effects for Model 2. The key variable of interest in both models is the relative sensitivity of net debt issuances to recessions for focused firms as measured by the coefficient on the interaction of the recession dummy with the focus dummy. The interaction term is negative and significant at the 1% level for the bank-dependent subsample. The marginal effects imply that recessions lead to a drop in net debt issued as a fraction of beginning-of-period assets of 4.3% for focused firms and of 2.0% for diversified firms. Thus, focused firms experience a 2.3% larger drop in net debt issued as a fraction of beginning-of-period assets relative to diversified firms during recessions. We do not find differences between the net debt issuances of diversified firms and focused firms in the non bank-dependent sub-sample during recessions. Assuming independence, the difference in the coefficients of the interaction term across the two sub-samples (Bank Dependent -Non-Bank Dependent) is − 4.4% with a t-statistic of 1.86 (p-value = .063).
Our results are not sensitive to different specifications of the debt issuance equation or to controlling for target leverage as in Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) . Since we document more cyclical debt issuances for bank-dependent focused firms relative to bank-dependent diversified firms, we interpret our results as consistent with bank-dependent focused firms being relatively more credit constrained during recessions. Our results are consistent with Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Korajczyk and Levy (2003) who also find more cyclical debt issues for constrained firms. We conclude that the higher cyclicality of focused firms' investment rates is likely due to binding credit constraints during recessions.
Concluding Remarks
This paper studies whether being diversified alleviates external credit constraints. We find that bankdependent focused firms are responsible for a disproportionate amount of the drop in sales and inventory investment that occurs during recessions. These results are consistent with corporate diversification alleviating credit constraints during recessions. Consistent with our hypothesis, we also find no significant difference in the sensitivities of growth rates to recessions across non bankdependent diversified and focused firms. This is expected, as non bank-dependent firms are unlikely to be credit constrained regardless of their organizational structure.
Our results have potential implications for financial managers. More cyclical investment in inventories and sales suggests that different risk management techniques may be needed for these firms.
There may be implications for providers of equity capital as well. Researchers are beginning to examine the impact of financial constraints on stock performance. Perez-Quiros and Timmerman (2000) document that small firms' risk and expected returns rise dramatically in recessions compared to those of large firms. They suggest that small firms have a higher sensitivity to credit market shocks and a higher probability of being credit constrained during recessions, as these firms tend to be bank dependent. Conflicting results are found by Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo (2001) . They find that stock returns of financially constrained manufacturers (as defined by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) ), move together over time, are lower than the returns of unconstrained firms, and are not sensitive to monetary policy, credit conditions, or business cycles. More studies examining the risk and return characteristics of constrained firms should shed additional light on this issue. We leave these topics for future research. Measured for the year preceding the two-year observation period.
Table 2 Sample Summary Statistics
Panel A provides arithmetic means of variables conditioned on firm organizational structure and macroeconomic conditions. The sample covers eight non-overlapping two-year periods. The periods 1979 The periods -1980 The periods , 1981 The periods -1982 The periods and 1990 The periods -1991 are classified as recessions while the periods 1983-1984, 1986-1987, 1988-1989, 1992-1993, and 1994-1995 are classified as non-recessions using NBER business cycle data. Focused firms are firms reporting a single business segment for the fiscal year preceding a given two-year observation period, while diversified firms are firms reporting at least two business segments. Bond ratings are collected from Standard and Poor's Bond Guides prior to 1985 and from Compustat from 1985 on. Commercial paper ratings are collected from Moody's Bond Record. See Table 1 for detailed definitions of the other variables. The dependent variable in Panel B is the standard deviation of firm quarterly operating cash flows (Compustat quarterly data item #21) over the twoyear observation period. The regression includes firm 2-digit SIC code fixed effects, but the coefficients are not shown. Values in parentheses are standard errors. Panel C shows the fraction of segments belonging to diversified firms for each twoyear observation period in the sample. 
Panel
Table 3 Industry-Adjusted Segment Sales Growth
The dependent variable is industry-adjusted segment sales growth over the two-year observation period. The sample covers eight non-overlapping two-year periods and consists of focused firms and segments of diversified firms. Focused firms are firms reporting a single business segment for the fiscal year preceding a given two-year period, while diversified firms are firms reporting at least two business segments. Specifications are conditional on whether a firm has a bond or commercial paper rating (non bank-dependent) or does not have a bond or commercial paper rating (bank-dependent). The periods 1979 The periods -1980 The periods , 1981 The periods -1982 The periods and 1990 The periods -1991 are classified as recessions while the periods 1983-1984, 1986-1987, 1988-1989, 1992-1993, and 1994-1995 are classified as non-recessions using NBER business cycle data. All model specifications contain a time trend variable (coefficient not shown) defined as the distance, in years, of the observation period from 1979. See Table 1 for detailed definitions of the other variables. The error structure in all model specifications is corrected for heteroskedasticity and within firm-period error correlation using the Huber-White robust estimator. Values in parentheses are standard errors. Table 4 Industry-Adjusted Segment Sales Growth -Instrumental Variables
Panel
The 1 st two columns of each panel display coefficients for a probit used to create Ĝ i , the generated instrument for the focus dummy. The dependent variable = 1 if the segment belongs to a firm reporting a single business segment for the fiscal year preceding a given two-year period, or 0 if the segment belongs to a firm reporting at least two business segments. Instruments used to generate the IV for the focus dummy are measured for the year preceding the two-year observation window and are: MI = 1 if the segment belongs to a firm with non-zero minority interest and 0 otherwise; PSDIV = fraction of industry sales (excluding the segment in question) belonging to segments of diversified firms; SNP = 1 if the segment belongs to a firm in the S&P 500 and 0 otherwise. An IV estimation is employed using 1, Ĝ i , and all the exogenous variables in the system as instruments for the focus dummy and for the focus dummy interacted with the recession dummy. The IV estimated coefficients are shown in columns 3 & 4 of each panel. The dependent variable in the IV estimation is industry-adjusted segment sales growth over the two-year observation period. The sample covers eight non-overlapping two-year periods and consists of focused firms and segments of diversified firms. The periods 1979 The periods -1980 The periods , 1981 The periods -1982 The periods and 1990 The periods -1991 are classified as recessions while the periods 1983-1984, 1986-1987, 1988-1989, 1992-1993, and 1994-1995 are classified as non-recessions using NBER business cycle data. Specifications are conditional on whether a firm has a bond or commercial paper rating (non bank-dependent) or does not have a bond or commercial paper rating (bank-dependent). All specifications include a time trend variable (coefficient not shown) defined as the distance, in years, from 1979 of the observation period. See Table 1 The first two columns display coefficients and standard errors for the probit analysis used to estimate the probability a segment remains over a two-year observation period. The dependent variable = 1 if the segment remains in the sample over the period, and 0 if a segment exits the sample. The identifying variable in the probit regression is given by Growth in Industry Sales, measured as the rate of change in total industry sales over the respective two-year period. The second two columns display coefficients from the second stage OLS regression and include the Inverse Mills Ratio from the first stage probit regressions to control for survivorship bias. The dependent variable is industry-adjusted segment sales growth over the two-year observation period. The sample covers eight non-overlapping two-year periods and consists of focused firms and segments of diversified firms. Focused firms are firms reporting a single business segment for the fiscal year preceding a given two-year period, while diversified firms are firms reporting at least two business segments. The periods 1979 The periods -1980 The periods , 1981 The periods -1982 The periods and 1990 The periods -1991 are classified as recessions while the periods 1983-1984, 1986-1987, 1988-1989, 1992-1993, and 1994-1995 are classified as nonrecessions using NBER business cycle data. Specifications are conditional on whether the firm has a bond or commercial paper rating (non bank-dependent) or does not have a bond or commercial paper rating (bank-dependent). See Table 1 for detailed definitions of the other variables. Values in parentheses are standard errors and are corrected in the second stage for including a prediction from the first stage. They are also corrected for heteroskedasticity and within firm-period error correlation using the Huber-White robust estimator. The dependent variable is firm sales growth over the two-year observation period. Models 1, 2 & 4 include two-digit SIC code fixed effects (industry fixed effects) while Model 3 includes firm fixed effects. Model 4 includes firms with segments operating in industries with all focused firms or all diversified firms. The sample covers eight non-overlapping two-year periods and consists of focused firms and diversified firms. Focused firms are firms reporting a single business segment for the fiscal year preceding a given two-year period, while diversified firms are firms reporting at least two business segments. The periods 1979 The periods -1980 The periods , 1981 The periods -1982 The periods and 1990 The periods -1991 are classified as recessions while the periods 1983-1984, 1986-1987, 1988-1989, 1992-1993, and 1994-1995 are classified as non-recessions using NBER business cycle data. Specifications are conditional on whether the firm has a bond or commercial paper rating (non bank-dependent) or does not have a bond or commercial paper rating (bank-dependent). All model specifications contain a time trend variable (coefficient not shown) defined as the distance, in years, of the observation period from 1979. See Table 1 for detailed definitions of the other variables. All estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and within industry-period error correlation using the Huber-White robust estimator. Values in parentheses are standard errors. The dependent variable is firm inventory growth over the two-year observation period. Models 1, 2 & 3 include firm two-digit SIC code fixed effects (industry fixed effects) while Model 4 includes firm fixed effects. The sample consists of only manufacturing focused and diversified firms defined as firms with SIC codes beginning with a two or a three. Focused firms are firms reporting a single business segment for the fiscal year preceding the two-year observation period while diversified firms are firms reporting at least two business segments. The periods 1979 The periods -1980 The periods , 1981 The periods -1982 The periods and 1990 The periods -1991 are classified as recessions while the periods 1983-1984, 1986-1987, 1988-1989, 1992-1993, and 1994-1995 are classified as non-recessions using NBER business cycle data. Specifications are conditional on whether the firm has a bond or commercial paper rating (non bank-dependent) or does not have a bond or commercial paper rating (bank-dependent). All model specifications contain a time trend variable (coefficient not shown) defined as the distance, in years, of the observation period from 1979. See Table  1 for detailed definitions of the other variables. All estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and within industry-period error correlation using the Huber-White robust estimator. Values in parentheses are standard errors. The dependent variable is net debt issuances over the two-year observation period (Data 111− Data 114 − Data 301) divided by beginning of period book value of total assets. This table reports coefficients and marginal effects for a net debt issue tobit with lower censoring at zero. Marginal effects, ∂E(y/x)/∂x j are evaluated at mean values of the x j and use all observations. The sample covers eight non-overlapping two-year periods and consists of focused firms and diversified firms. The periods 1979 The periods -1980 The periods , 1981 The periods -1982 The periods and 1990 The periods -1991 are classified as recessions while the periods 1983-1984, 1986-1987, 1988-1989, 1992-1993, and 1994-1995 are classified as non-recessions using NBER business cycle data. Specifications are conditional on whether the firm has a bond or commercial paper rating (non bank-dependent) or does not have a bond or commercial paper rating (bankdependent). All model specifications contain a time trend variable (coefficient not shown) defined as the distance, in years, of the observation period from 1979. See Table 1 
